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INTRODUCTION
Automotive product development is progressively becoming 
more complex as systems are required to address both 
environmental concerns and increasing sophistication of 
customer expectations, within a highly competitive 
marketplace. The new technologies introduced in response to 
these requirements are ubiquitously multidisciplinary, relying on 
control systems and software to manage the integration of 
technological systems. Given the ever increasing customer 
expectations for robust and reliable products, the technical and 
organisational challenge is to evolve and enhance tools for 
robust engineering design, in order to cope with the increased 
technical complexity and multi-disciplinarity of automotive 
systems.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is widely regarded 
as core tool for evaluating, documenting and mitigating risks in 
the product creation process, covering both product and 
manufacturing process design. However, the author's 
evaluation of the use of the FMEA methodology across a 
number of OEMs, showed that it is generally not deployed 
effectively within a systems engineering context. Based on 
these observations, the main technical challenges of FMEA 
deployment within a complex automotive system can be 
summarised as follows:
I. System Complexity: The complexity of the system being 
analysed often results in difficulties in identifying and 
structuring the functions to be analysed leading to time 
consuming and resource intensive analysis (1). This usually 
results in extremely large FMEA documents with a complex 
unwieldy structure, which includes mixed levels of resolution 
due to poor definition of the scope in relation to the level of 
analysis within the systems hierarchy. One consequence 
of this is that it becomes difficult to evaluate the integrity 
and comprehensiveness of the document, for example, in 
ensuring that all critical functions and failure modes have 
been captured. This makes the document's role of driving 
both design improvements and efficient verification difficult 
to achieve (2), and also leads to documents with little reuse 
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value as they are not structured for ease of knowledge 
storage and recovery. 
II. Systems Deployment: FMEAs are commonly deployed 
at the component or subsystem level, once the design 
is complete, with little evidence that systems integration 
requirements are consistently captured and addressed (3, 
4). While there is recognition that FMEA analysis should be 
conducted within a systems engineering framework, starting 
at the “top system” level, FMEA Guidelines (5, 6) give little 
or no advice on the mechanics of linking between systems 
levels within a complex system, or the effective deployment 
and management across engineering teams. Modern 
automotive systems design typically involves many design 
teams either within the same company and/or from different 
suppliers, with each team developing their own FMEA 
without connecting it effectively with the higher / lower level 
analysis. It is also the case that different teams, particularly 
where these are from different suppliers, may employ 
different approaches to FMEA (7). This makes it extremely 
difficult to map and manage critical design parameters in an 
integrated fashion 
III. Multidisciplinarity: The ubiquitously multidisciplinary 
nature of modern automotive systems as a mix of electro-
mechanical, controls and software introduces a significant 
challenge stemming from the fact that different engineering 
disciplines use different approaches to FMEA. In particular 
software and controls use different approaches compared 
to conventional electro-mechanical FMEAs which makes 
validation of the functional integration of the system as a 
whole a very difficult task (8, 9). 
IV. Multi-domain Integration: From a systems perspective, 
Design and Process FMEA are not effectively connected 
through the systems hierarchy. While there is usually a 
good connection between component DFMEA and process 
PFMEA based on critical and significant characteristics 
(YC/YS and CC/SC) (6), this is not linked to higher level 
functional requirements and so the effect of the lower level 
critical/significant characteristic on system performance is 
poorly understood.
These considerations add to the shortcomings of FMEA 
stemming from a reliance on brainstorming in conducting 
function analysis, functional decomposition and cause 
identification as discussed previously (10). Even if expert 
facilitation of both the FMEA process itself and in brainstorming 
is employed as recommended (2, 11), this is unlikely to 
systematically tackle the complexity challenge. Considerable 
attention has also been paid in the literature to difficulties 
associated with the use of the use Severity, Occurrence and 
Detection rating scales within the FMEA methodology with 
numerous recommendations for improvement being made (3). 
While it is important that any use of rating scales needs to be 
meaningful the present authors consider that a good 
understanding of the function and hence failure modes 
associated a particular system design and their decomposition 
is more fundamental.
The fundamental role of the FMEA in effective Failure Mode 
Avoidance (FMA) has been widely discussed, most prominently 
by Davis (12) who regarded the FMEA as the “superordinate 
document” for FMA. This reflects Davis' view that the FMEA is 
best placed to comprehensively document the organization's 
knowledge on failure mode avoidance, covering failure modes, 
effective detection events for failure modes, design guidelines 
and robustness countermeasures to avoid failure modes due to 
mistakes and lack of robustness, and robust design verification 
plans and outcomes. The linkage and integration between 
FMEA and robustness tools has been discussed by several 
other authors(6, 13).
The main contribution of the Failure Mode Avoidance process 
proposed by the research team at the University of Bradford 
Engineering Quality Improvement Centre (BEQIC) consists of 
the introduction of a structured framework for function analysis 
of complex engineering systems (10), which facilitates complex 
system decomposition on a functional basis, providing an 
effective approach for task breakdown for the conventional 
deployment of failure avoidance through DFMEA with 
robustness linkages. This structured approach underpinned by 
fundamental systems thinking in identification of the functional 
chains significantly enhances the rigour of the analysis, 
removing the brainstorming basis of conventional function 
analysis feeding DFMEA development.
The introduction of the 4-step FMA process of Function 
Analysis, Function Failure Analysis, Robust Countermeasure 
Development and Robust Design Verification (14) further 
strengthened the information flow between the engineering 
tools. Several industrial case studies have been used to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of this framework, including the 
way in which information flow within the FMA process 
enhances the development and integrity of the FMEA (10, 14, 
15). The strategy for “systems engineering based on failure 
mode avoidance” has been discussed in (15) based on the 
horizontal deployment of the FMA process at each system level 
with vertical integration between the systems levels, illustrated 
with a case study on a Diesel aftertreatment design analysis. In 
this paper we reconsider this case study as the basis for 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the FMA process to support 
the effective deployment of the FMEA within the systems 
engineering framework.
The aim of the work presented in this paper is to consider how 
the FMA process and tools support the effective deployment of 
FMEAs within an integrated systems engineering approach, 
addressing the challenges outlined above effectively. Key 
aspects in terms of the novelty in the approach rest on the 
identification and organization of functions through the analysis 
of state flow and the use of detailed interface analysis to 
identify causes of functional failure.
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DFMEA DEVELOPMENT AND USE WITHIN A 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK
DFMEA Development within the FMA Process
Within the FMA process, functional analysis, in which function 
identification and decomposition is achieved using fundamental 
engineering thinking through the development of a System 
State Flow Diagram (10) is a key tool for the decomposition of 
the complex system. Based on the System State Flow Diagram 
a Function Tree and a Boundary Diagram, as a schematic 
representation of the design structure that delivers the system 
functionality, can be derived. The Boundary Diagram is then 
used as the basis for the interface analysis in which the 
exchanges of energy, material and information which occur 
both between the design elements that comprise a system and 
between the design elements within the system and elements 
external to the system are identified in an Interface Matrix. 
Interface Analysis Tables are used to extend the information 
contained within the Interface Matrix, by documenting the 
nature of the interface exchange and the functional 
requirements associated with each exchange. Figure 1 
illustrates the information flow between the different FMA tools 
within Function Analysis.
Figure 1. Information Flow within Function Analysis (For larger version 
of graphics see Appendix)
The Interface Table includes a description of each exchange 
that occurs at the interface being analysed along with the 
interface function required to manage that exchange. The main 
function of the exhaust system, which can be affected by the 
interface exchanges, is identified from the Function Tree and 
documented in the table.
Thus, the Interface Analysis Table performs a very important 
role in documenting all the functional requirements for system 
integration, covering both the main functions and the interface 
functions. This information is also fundamental for the 
development of the DFMEA, which aims to identify and 
evaluate system function failure modes in terms of their effects 
and root causes. The mechanics of the link between the 
interface table and DFMEA are illustrated in Figure 2. 
Consistent with the conventional functional based FMEA 
methodology (5), the main functions in the DFMEA can be 
extracted from the Interface Table. Each of the four types of 
functional failure mode of the main function (no function, partial 
function, intermittent function and unintended function) are 
considered in turn in order to establish their effects and 
causes. Effects are identified in the usual manner (5) along 
with the severity rating and class of each effect.
Figure 2. Transfer of Information from Interface Table to DFMEA
Since interfaces exchanges affect the performance of the 
system, the failure of an interface function, specified to manage 
such an exchange, will potentially cause system failure; i.e. 
failure modes associated with interface exchange functions are 
potential causes of system main function failure modes. This 
means that the Interface Table, by providing a comprehensive 
source of information on interface exchanges and the functions 
required to manage them, furnishes information on the causes 
of failure of main functions. Information is transferred from the 
Interface Table to the DFMEA in terms of potential causes of 
failure through answering the questions “How can this 
exchange cause failure of the main function?” and/or “Which 
failure modes of the interface function are causes of failure of 
the main function?”. The identification of potential causes of 
failure is then repeated for each main function in turn.
This demonstrates that the DFMEA is substantially based upon 
information contained in the Interface Table in terms of both 
structure and content. The comprehensive nature of the 
Interface Table means that all main function and associated 
failure modes of a system should be analysed and that a 
comprehensive list of causes based on the identification of all 
interface functions are identified and documented in the 
DFMEA. Since the Interface Table is based on the use of a 
Boundary Diagram developed from a System State Flow 
Diagram (15) which itself is established on the basis of 
fundamental engineering thinking this ensures that the DFMEA 
is self-contained by being limited to a review of (only) the main 
functions that achieve system function. The structure inherent 
in the Interface Table in terms of the listing of Main Functions 
and Interface Functions is passed across to the DFMEA 
meaning that the related information in the two documents can 
be easily reconciled.
DFMEA Development across Engineering 
Disciplines
A strong feature of the SSFD based function analysis and 
decomposition is that the functional analysis framework (and 
by implication the FMA process) can be deployed across 
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engineering disciplines. This provides the basis for a common 
approach to both hardware and software DFMEA development. 
For example, the DFMEA for the software Control Feature that 
manages regeneration of the Diesel Particulate Filter was 
developed by first conducting interface analysis on the basis of 
a Boundary Diagram which is derived directly from the System 
State Flow Diagram for the feature (Figure 3) (15).
Figure 3. Information Flow for DPF Regeneration Feature Analysis 
(SSFD through Interface Analysis to DFMEA)
The nature of the System State Flow Diagram ensures that the 
Function Analysis process and hence the DFMEA which results 
from this analysis is effectively maintained at a single level 
within the systems hierarchy, with clear linkage to the other 
levels. This latter aspect of the DFMEA development process is 
considered next.
DFMEA as a Part of Systems Engineering
DFMEA Systems Cascade
Systems engineering is facilitated by conducting the 4-Step 
FMA process at each level of the systems hierarchy (15). 
DFMEAs are developed at each level using the process 
described above, with the System DFMEA being based on 
system level interface analysis and the Subsystem DFMEA 
being based on subsystem level interface analysis, etc. This 
ensures that the content of a DFMEA at a particular level 
reflects that level rather than having a mix of content reflecting 
multiple levels. An FMA approach to systems engineering is 
founded on the cascade and deployment of interface 
exchanges through the systems hierarchy with interface 
analysis forming the central core or backbone of the process 
(15). Thus interface analysis provides the conduit for the 
transfer of coherent information between DFMEAs for the 
same system at the different system levels, as shown in  
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Systems Engineering Cascade and Information Flow to 
DFMEAs
As illustrated is in Figure 4 by the Boundary Diagrams the 
Exhaust Aftertreatment system is “nested” within the 
Powertrain system; similarly, the DPF Soot Load Sensing 
(SLS) is in turn nested within the Exhaust Aftertreatment 
system. This relationship is reflected in the formal mechanism 
for the cascade of external interfaces within the Systems 
Engineering framework described in (15). DFMEAs are 
developed at each level of the systems hierarchy based on the 
Interface Analysis conducted at that level. Thus a coherent and 
contained series of DFMEAs are developed at each level with 
the DFMEAs at each level linked through the interface cascade 
to the level below/above through the functional requirements 
cascade which is a feature of the interface analysis cascade. 
Considering this linkage bottom-up, the SLS Component Level 
DFMEA is linked in the Exhaust Subsystem DFMEA which in 
turn it is linked into the System Level Powertrain DFMEA. This 
linkage to the higher/lower levels is true for all DFMEAs at any 
particular level. The coherent relationship between DFMEAs at 
different levels is also seen in the cascade of critical 
characteristics or YCs (5) also marked in Figure 4. By way of 
example the critical characteristic associated with meeting the 
emission requirements at system level is coherently linked 
through the cascade of DFMEAs to, amongst other things, a 
critical characteristic associated with the conversion of the 
pressure across the DPF into a voltage signal by Soot Load 
Sensing subassembly.
The Boundary Diagrams, and hence more fundamentally, the 
System State Flow Diagrams at each of the system levels, 
structures the cascade and substantiates the linkage of 
DFMEAs within the systems framework. A complete DFMEA 
cascade is illustrated in Figure 5 with the Powertrain System 
DFMEA being cascaded/linked to a series of Subsystem 
DFMEAs corresponding to the design elements that achieve 
the Powertrain main functions as defined on the Powertrain 
System State Flow Diagram. Each Subsystem DFMEA is then 
cascaded/linked to a series of Component DFMEAs which 
correspond to the design elements that comprise each 
particular subsystem; the cascade for the Exhaust Subsystem 
being illustrated in Figure 5. Figure 5 is somewhat simplified by 
not including all of the design elements that typically make up a 
Powertrain and Exhaust.
Figure 5. DFMEA Cascade between the Systems Levels
A practical benefit of using the structured FMA process to 
facilitate the development of DFMEAs within a systems 
engineering framework is that it replaces the often long and 
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unwieldy DFMEA documents with a series of comprehensive 
but contained DFMEAs of a few pages length, with coherent 
structural and information links between them.
DFMEA, Fault Tree Analysis and the P-Diagram
The structural weakness of DFMEA is that the principal 
information flow is horizontally across the document making 
the identification of failure modes due to a combination of 
causes difficult to identify. Fault Tree Analysis is widely used as 
a structured approach for identifying combinations of events as 
causes for system failures. Function Fault Tree Analysis is 
(FFTA) (16) underpinned by a function based approach to 
constructing a fault tree, based on the premise that a fault tree 
can be regarded as the mirror image in the failure domain of 
the corresponding function tree. Therefore, the FFTA 
development can be fully integrated with the FMA function 
analysis tools. In particular the higher levels of a Function Fault 
Tree are a mirror in the failure domain of the associated 
Function Tree set in the success domain while lower level 
causal events on the tree are based on information flow from 
the Interface Table.
From the point of view of function failure analysis, the main 
advantage of the FFTA is that it is based on a vertical 
information flow, developed top-down through the successive 
systems engineering levels. On this basis the FFTA can be 
used as a complementary tool for the DFMEA to overcome its 
weakness in identifying failure modes causes as combination 
of events. Potential combinations of causes of failure of the top 
event can be readily seen on the Function Fault Tree because 
of its graphical nature and since the causal events on the 
DFMEA and Function Fault Tree are both identified on the 
basis of the same interface analysis these combined causes of 
failure can be documented directly as potential causes of 
failure of the main function on the DFMEA. That is, the DFMEA 
can be updated to include combinations of causes of failure. 
Figure 6 illustrates the information flow between tools, noting 
that information from the upper events on the FFTA is used to 
update the DPF Regen Feature DFMEA, while information 
from the lower events on the Fault Tree is used to update the 
SLS DFMEA. Because of its nature the Feature may be 
considered to be at an intermediate level between the Exhaust 
Aftertreatment System at subsystem level and the SLS at 
component level.
Figure 6. Information Flow Interface Table to P-Diagram and DFMEA 
via Function Fault Tree
Having identified a comprehensive list of potential causes of 
failure on the DFMEA the existing countermeasures are 
assessed as Current Prevention Controls and where these are 
deemed inadequate, enhanced countermeasures are 
developed and documented on the DFMEA as Recommended 
Actions. Together the P-Diagram and Robustness Checklist 
(RCL) (6) along with the FFTA facilitate the establishment of 
appropriate countermeasures. FFTA assists the identification of 
countermeasures because it focuses attention on combinations 
of causes that might otherwise have been missed and 
conversely on functions that need to be achieved (16). In terms 
of this latter point FFTA is particular powerful at identifying 
countermeasures based on functional redundancy. The 
P-Diagram and RCL facilitate the identification of 
countermeasure by firstly identifying noise factors as causes of 
robustness failure and subsequently aiding the establishment 
of appropriate noise factor management strategies. Since 
noise factors can only affect system performance by an 
exchange of energy, material or information at an interface the 
Interface Table provides comprehensive information on noise 
factors i.e. the i.e. interface analysis facilities the development 
of the P-Diagram (as illustrated in figure 6) and hence RCL 
(10).
While the top event on the Function Fault Tree can be at any 
level with the tree extending down to root causes at 
component, level in the authors' experience P-Diagrams are 
most effective when developed at the lower system levels of 
analysis. This is because system complexity at the higher 
system levels along with the large number of noise factors 
affecting the system is such that it becomes very difficult to 
isolate the effect of individual noise factors on individual 
components. The need to isolate the effect of individual noise 
factors on individual components is necessary since it is only 
at component level that the design actions required to 
implement countermeasures to robustness failures are 
implemented. Although countermeasures are implemented at 
the lower (component) levels of the systems hierarchy the 
need for countermeasures is identified at the higher levels for 
those aspects of system or subsystem which are known not to 
be robust. Thus, typically, the System and Subsystem level 
DFMEA Recommended Actions reflect plans to implement 
countermeasures at Component level while the Component 
level DFMEA Recommended Actions reflect the detail of the 
countermeasures.
DFMEA and Design Verification
Having implemented countermeasures documented as 
Recommended Actions in the DFMEA there is a need to verify 
that each countermeasure is effective in ensuring that the 
failure mode with which it is associated does not occur. The 
Robustness Checklist facilitates the incorporation of each 
significant noise factor effect into a least one of the series of 
tests that make up the Design Verification Plan (DVP) in a way 
that minimises the total number of tests that are required (17). 
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The DFMEA is then updated with the results of design 
verification being documented as the Results of 
Recommended Actions.
Figure7. Information flow between DFMEA and DVP
As depicted in Figure 7 the system level DFMEA facilitates the 
development of the system level design verification testing 
documented in the system level DVP with the subsystem and 
component level DFMEAs facilitating the development of the 
subsystem and component level verification testing 
respectively. The functional decomposition depicted in 
requirements cascade through the DFMEAs and achieved 
through function analysis and interface analysis support the 
upward integration and linkage of the different levels of design 
verification.
Process FMEA and YC to CC Linkage
The process outlined in this paper for deploying DFMEAs 
within a systems engineering context can be extended to the 
process domain and the development of PFMEAs. The 
correspondence of the function analysis tools deployed in the 
design domain with similar tools used in the manufacturing 
process domain has been discussed in (18) on the basis of an 
aerospace manufacturing process. Similarly, the Dynamic 
Control Planning methodology (19) used in the automotive 
industry can be shown to be directly analogous to the function 
analysis process discussed in this paper, thus enabling 
coherent information flow between the DFMEAs developed 
during product development and PFMEAs developed during 
manufacturing process development. This enables, for 
example, the cascade of YC/YS critical/significant 
characteristics through the system hierarchy to be coherently 
linked to CC/SC critical/significant manufacturing 
characteristics (5) which are then documented as such on the 
associated PFMEA.
DISCUSSION
This paper introduced a Systems Engineering framework 
based on a Failure Mode Avoidance process, within which 
DFMEAs can be developed in an integrated, rigorous and 
structured manner The DFMEA is created as an integral part of 
a structured 4-Step FMA process based on coherent 
information flow between engineering tools both within, and 
between, the different levels of the systems hierarchy. The way 
in which the use of the BEQIC 4-Step FMA process addresses 
the challenges to effective deployment of DFMEA within a 
System Engineering framework is discussed next.
Challenge I: System Complexity
The challenge associated with System Complexity is to 
structure the DFMEAs with clearly defined functions such that 
all the analysis contained within any one document is at the 
same level of resolution in terms of the systems hierarchy. 
Function Analysis enables both the main functions that convert 
the inputs to outputs in a system and the functions that 
manage the interface exchanges that affect system 
performance to be identified on the basis of structured 
fundamental engineering thinking. This means that each main 
function which is the subject of DFMEA analysis are pre-
defined in an Interface Table before DFMEA development 
commences with all the main functions being at the same level 
of resolution in terms of the systems hierarchy. Equally since 
the interface functions contained within an Interface Table will 
also be at the same level the causal analysis within the 
corresponded DFMEA will also be at level of resolution which 
is appropriate to the level of DFMEA being developed. The 
manner in which the interface table is developed also leads to 
the development of a contained FMEA document with 
straightforward access to the key knowledge that it contains 
both in terms of ability to being able to assess the integrity of 
that knowledge and its subsequent use.
This is a significant improvement over the conventional 
approach to DFMEA development in which the functions to be 
analysed may be identified either through discussion alone or 
on the basis of a Function Tree which itself is developed on the 
basis of brainstorming. The authors' experience of using the 
conventional approach is that, in starting a DFMEA a 
considerable amount of time is expended in gaining agreement 
within the team developing the DFMEA as to what functions 
should be analysed with the resulting discussion tending to 
identify functions at different levels of the systems hierarchy; 
this is particularly true when different people in the team have 
design responsibility for particular aspects of a system since 
they tend to focus more intently on “their” part. The result of 
this conventional process is a list of main functions which is not 
necessarily exhaustive (i.e. some functions are missed) and 
functions which correspond to different levels of the systems 
hierarchy leading to a lengthy DFMEA document of doubtful 
integrity which is difficult to analyse.
Challenge II: Systems Deployment
The Systems Deployment challenge is to develop a series of 
contained DFMEAs which link coherently across and between 
levels of the systems hierarchy. By decomposing the system 
on a structured functional basis, the deployment of the DFMEA 
within the system can be managed through a series of “nested” 
DFMEAs, matching the nested structure of the system 
decomposition, as illustrated in Figure 4. This has a great 
benefit for the deployment, in that the effort of the FMEA teams 
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is much more focused, hence more manageable from the time 
point of view; a typical DFMEA at any level in the hierarchy 
(illustrated in Figure 5) can be completed with hours of team 
effort.
This addresses a common weakness of current practice which 
often leads to the production of large DFMEAs, sometimes 
extending to several hundreds of pages in length which prove 
extremely difficult to analyse particularly in terms of the 
linkages between system levels (15). Additionally within the 
conventional approach lower level Component DFMEAs are 
often developed in isolation of, and hence with no linkage to, 
higher level systems analysis.
Challenge III: Multidisciplinarity
The challenge associated with multidiciplinarity is the ability to 
use a common approach to the development of DFMEAs 
across the different engineering disciplines. The BEQIC FMA 
process is applicable across all engineering disciplines so 
enabling the development of DFMEAs for each separate 
discipline to be based on the same fundamental processes. 
This contrasts to the current situation where typically different 
approaches are used in the development of DFMEAs in 
different disciplines. Equally important, using a common 
approach across engineering disciplines means that a DFMEA 
can document potential causes of failure associated with poor 
systems integration. For example, it can highlight potential 
causes of failure at the interfaces between of a software based 
Control Feature and the hardware that the feature manages.
Challenge IV: Multi-Domain Integration
The multi-domain challenge is to link the coherent information 
flow through the system hierarchy related to critical and 
significant characteristics in design (YC/YS) to their 
counterparts of critical/significant characteristics in 
manufacturing (CC/SC).
The coherent linkage that the 4-Step FMA process provides 
between YC characteristics through the systems hierarchy and 
on to CC characteristics in manufacturing can be compared to 
the conventional approach in which, in the absence of 
consistent linkage between DFMEAs at the different levels, 
there is a tendency to assign a product design characteristic as 
“critical” within a Component DFMEA alone. This absence of 
coherent linkage between a Component DFMEA and higher 
level DFMEAs through interface analysis means that the effect 
of any particular component level design characteristic on 
system performance may not be fully understood and hence 
the true significance of the characteristic is not fully evaluated. 
This means that, in the absence of knowledge, characteristics 
are sometimes deemed to be significant “to be on the safe 
side” which results in an unnecessary level of manufacturing 
control and hence unnecessary cost. Equally some critical 
characteristics may not be identified if the significance of 
characteristics is judged through component level DFMEAs 
alone which may result in costly failures.
Other Benefits
Within the 4-Step FMA process potential causes of failure of 
each main function are identified as failure events associated 
with the functions required to manage interface exchanges that 
have been identified as a part of Function Analysis. Evidence 
from the field demonstrates that the majority of failures of 
automotive systems are due to poor management of interface 
exchanges (20) emphasising the importance of identifying such 
causes during product design. Indeed it can be argued that the 
vast majority, if not all, causes of failure are due to interface 
exchanges meaning that developing a DFMEA within the 
4-Step FMA process results in an exhaustive list of causes 
being identified. This can be contrasted with the conventional 
approach to the identification of causes on a DFMEA through 
brainstorming which as the experience from industry practice 
indicates, results in a significant number of potential root 
causes not being identified during the product design process 
and hence effective countermeasures not being established. 
Additionally it is the authors' experience that in identifying 
functions (and hence and function failure modes) through 
brainstorming that team members often confuse failure modes 
and causes thereby documenting some of these in 
inappropriate columns on the DFMEA leading to a loss of 
structure of the document. The 4-Step FMA process helps to 
overcome this confusion by identifying main functions and 
information on the causes of failure of these main functions in 
clearly separated columns in the Interface Table.
The inclusion of the graphical tool of Function Fault Tree 
Analysis within the BEQIC approach to the development of 
DFMEAs, with the DFMEA and associated Function Fault Tree 
both being developed on the basis of information flow from 
common interface analysis, means that the DFMEA can be 
easily updated to include multiple cause events where 
appropriate. Like the DFMEA and Function Fault Tree an 
associated P-diagram is also developed on the basis of the 
common interface analysis information with the P-Diagram also 
benefiting from being a graphically based document. The 
P-Diagram facilitates the flow of information, via the RCL, that 
enables the development of effective Design Verification. In 
convention usage, for example, as a part of the Ford 
Robustness Linkages process (6) the P-Diagram identifies 
noise factors as causes of failure to be included in the DFMEA. 
However, since the conventional approach to the development 
of P-Diagrams involves brainstorming noise factors this means 
that the causes subsequently documented in the DFMEA are 
based on brainstorming. In the 4-Step FMA process the use of 
the P-Diagram is reserved to help develop the 
countermeasures subsequently documented on the DFMEA 
with the noise factor being identified on the basis of interface 
analysis which is itself based on fundamental engineering 
thinking. The P-Diagram's role of identifying causes of failure 
on the DFMEA is seen as redundant since both these causes 
and the noise factors identified on the P-Diagram are sourced 
from common interface analysis.
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As a final point the authors' experience of developing DFMEAs 
using the 4-Step BEQIC FMA process within a systems 
engineering framework has been encouraging in that more 
contained and hence manageable set of coherently related 
documents covering all levels of the systems hierarchy have 
been generated with the overall set of DFMEAs being 
significantly more comprehensive than the previous generation 
of DFMEAs.
REFERENCES
1. Hunt J. E., Pugh, D. R., Price, C. J., Failure mode effects analysis: 
a practical application of functional modelling. Applied Artificial 
Intelligence, Vol 9 Issue 1, pp33-44, 1995.
2. Carlson, C., Lessons Learned for Effective FMEAs, 58th Annual 
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), IEEE, 2012.
3. Liu, Hu-Chen, Liu, Long, Liu, Nan, Risk evaluation approaches 
in failure mode and effects analysis: A literature review, Expert 
Systems with Applications, Vol 40, pp 828-38, 2013.
4. Kumar, C., Maass, E., FMEAs Using a Functional Modeling Based 
Approach, 59th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
(RAMS), IEEE, 2013.
5. Potential Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 4th Edition, 
AIAG, 2008.
6. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis FMEA Handbook (with 
Robustness Linkages) v4.2, Ford Motor Company, 2011.
7. Fritzsche, R., “Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA): A 
Comparison Between VDA-Approach Versus QS-9000,” SAE 
Technical Paper 2011-01-2280, 2011, doi:10.4271/2011-01-2280.
8. Ozarin, N., Bridging Software and Hardware FMEA in Complex 
Systems, 59th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
(RAMS), IEEE, 2013.
9. Raheja, D., “Software FMEA: A Missing Link in Design for 
Robustness,” SAE Technical Paper 2005-01-0817, 2005, 
doi:10.4271/2005-01-0817.
10. Campean, I., Henshall, E., Brunson, D., Day, A. et al., “A Structured 
Approach for Function Analysis of Complex Automotive Systems,” 
SAE Int. J. Mater. Manuf. 4(1):1255-1267, 2011, doi:10.4271/2011-
01-1268.
11. Bluvband, Z., Grabov P., Failure Analysis of FMEA, 55th Annual 
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), IEEE, 2009.
12. Davis, T., Failure Mode Avoidance Seminar, University of Bradford, 
UK, November 2007.
13. Kumar, C., Maass, E., FMEAs Using a Functional Modeling Based 
Approach, 59th Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium 
(RAMS), IEEE, 2013.
14. Campean, I., Henshall, E., Systems Engineering Design through 
Failure Mode Avoidance - an Automotive Industry Perspective, in 
Enduring and Cost-Effective Engineering Support Solution, Eds 
Roy et al, Proc 1st Int Conf on Through-life Engineering Services 
Conference, Cranfield University Press, 99-107, 2012.
15. Campean, I., Henshall, E., and Rutter, B., “Systems Engineering 
Excellence Through Design: An Integrated Approach Based on 
Failure Mode Avoidance,” SAE Int. J. Mater. Manf. 6(3):389-401, 
2013, doi:10.4271/2013-01-0595.
16. Campean, F. and Henshall, E., “A Function Failure Approach to 
Fault Tree Analysis for Automotive Systems,” SAE Technical Paper 
2008-01-0846, 2008, doi:10.4271/2008-01-0846.
17. Henshall, E. and Campean, F., “Design Verification as a Key 
Deliverable of Function Failure Avoidance,” SAE Int. J. Mater. 
Manuf. 3(1):445-453, 2010, doi:10.4271/2010-01-0708.
18. Goodland, J, Campean IF, Caunce, A, Victory, J, Jupp, M, 
A Manufacturing Failure Mode Avoidance for Aerospace 
Manufacturing, IMECE2013-64606, Proceedings of the ASME 
2013 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and 
Exposition.
19. Ford Motor Company, The Strategy of Dynamic Control Planning, 
Training and Reference Manual, 1997.
20. Webb, R.D. Investigation into the application of robustness and 
reliability tools to the design process. MSc thesis, University of 
Bradford, 2002.
Henshall et al / SAE Int. J. Mater. Manf. / Volume 7, Issue 2 (April 2014) 287
Downloaded from SAE International by Bradford University, Friday, December 09, 2016
APPENDIX
LARGER SCALE VERSION OF GRAPHICS
Figure 1. Information Flow within Function Analysis
Figure 2. Transfer of Information from Interface Table to DFMEA
Figure 3. Information Flow for DPF Regeneration Feature Analysis (SSFD through Interface Analysis to DFMEA)
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Figure 4. Systems Engineering Cascade and Information Flow to DFMEAs
Figure 5. DFMEA Cascade between the Systems Levels
Figure 6. Information Flow Interface Table to P-Diagram and DFMEA via Function Fault Tree
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Figure7. Information flow between DFMEA and DVP
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